[LIPS] Change to one vote per account

Golden Light Limited goldenlightltd at protonmail.com
Sat Feb 9 13:28:52 EST 2019

Here Santerr, let me add some comments from myself.

The problems that I see are primarily the inefficiency of the current system as well as the centralization of votes. Of course, you can argue with this because it is subjective but looking at the mood of the community, many people have the same opinion.

The main problem that we all see is the huge impact of the cartel on delegates who are in 101. There is no way to get to 101 without the support of the cartel. The community does not decide, the cartels decide. I know that I can vote for everyone, but let's not fool ourselves, we see what is happening now. Voices change for each call of the cartel. I believe that 1 vote on the account will not solve this problem and in addition will result in the collapse of many initiatives for the development of the ecosystem. The current proposal is explicit treatment of symptoms and not the actual source of the disease. This will bring new and new problems. It does not make sense.

What I suggest:
The creation of a DAO where the power will indeed pass into the hands of the community and the problem of the cartel will be solved once and for all, despite the fact that they will be able to exist all the time. This is important because I do not like restrictions, I would like everyone to be able to act as they want and have no artificial restrictions.

We create a Community DAO fund which is fed by 10-20% delegate awards. The changes are saved in the protocol and pass automatically. I accept that we are introducing the changes proposed by HQ with 1 voice to the account. Which will probably result in a 90% reward distribution. Many people say that this is a problem. I will try to prove that it can be a benefit for the whole community. Let me answer the requests of the hirish delegate, I will be able to explain this vividly on the example:

Hirish - " As a developer and promoter, since there are low incentives, there will be also low level of participation in the project. I honestly think I would never have coded all the Ledger Integration and all the other project I did with low incentives. And the reasons is simple: I can make more money by doing something else (see? greediness push people to do *also* great things!). The same conclusion could be made for a promoter point of view. We had tons of Lisk Meetups around the world. I believe this will disappear. Projects like Lisk Utrecht Center and Elite Center would not have been possible without a proper amount of funds."
Santerr - Not true. Only the influence on these activities by the delegates will change. Delegates will still be able to do great things, all they have to do is come up with a DAO idea and the community will decide if it makes sense. If so, you will receive the funds that you think are needed for this project. The only thing that will change is that empty promises will have to turn into deeds. Hirish, you're one of the few delegates who does something. Praise you for it, but even if you share 90% you will have DAO funds to implement your ideas. At the start your confidence coefficient grows because the community sees you are not passive.

Hirish - As a community member interested in shares, this proposal seems like heaven. But I'm not sure they're going to get more shares. Since you have only 1 vote, the 90% share acts like an upper-bound-hard-cap on how much you can get from vote sharing. Currently you get in average 25% from *every* delegate. It is also true that with "1 vote per account" you will share the vote with a lot less people. But I'm not sure this will be enough to get more. Automatic Bot that does switch of votes in favor of low-ranked high-shares delegates will popup making delegate ranks very unstable. This will create network instabilities if delegates are not ready. I'm quite sure (but it needs more calculations) that voters will get less rewards in average compared to the current solution if they do not act on weekly basis on their vote.
Santerr - I think that the difference in remuneration for voters will not change fundamentally, but it is not important. Manipulation in the votes will be hard to beware of open voting. The next stage of HQ should be the pursuit of anonymous votes. Today we know that it requires huge amounts of work. In my proposal, it will not have too much impact if at all.
Your pros and cons Hirish
- New delegates will join the game - exactly. Enormous opportunities will be given to delegates who now have nothing, even though they proved their usefulness for the ecosystem. Examples: Liskpoland and proline. It is enough that they apply to DAO and, taking into account the reputation they have, they can count on co-financing of their projects from the fund.
- Large groups will lose power, but probably won't disappear - groups are not a problem how their functioning is a problem. My suggestion solves it, groups can exist, but they will not have the power to control the community like puppets.
- More competition for active delegate slots, but (CONS) based mostly on share percentage and not on great contributions.

- Voters will get less rewards if they do no switch vote on regular basis - requires more research. I believe that the rewards will not change too much.
- It could cause network instabilities - This will not happen. Being a good delegate and keeping your node in good condition will increase the trust of the community, which results in the delegate being able to count on financing their projects at DAO. In addition, we introduce an additional% rewards for good nodes in a specific time unit. For example, a delegate's prize increases by several percent every 3-6-12 months if its node functions without any problem. After a year, he can earn 10% more. Additional rewards are paid from DAO. I think that this is good and will motivate you to do a good job.
- Low incentives to keep secure the network - You do not want to do nothing. You are rewarded for running the node and this is your job. Nobody blames you. There will be others who will do more and the number of projects I believe will be greater than today on the side of the delegates. I remind you - Hirish - you are one of the few who can see that he is doing something.

- Low incentives to contribute to Lisk -   I do not think that the rewards will be low. It all depends on the price of lisk. In the future even 100lsk can be worth a lot. Of course, he realizes that a large part of the delegates may give up because nobody can come to terms with a reduced level of living, currently the fox is a real gold coin. But this is not a problem, others will be better. And those who leave will confirm that the real motivation was greed and not the development of the ecosystem.

- It is not a definitive solution
- Projects like sidechains and Lisk centers and meetups won’t be funded anymore since financial incentives are low. - on the contrary, I believe that the chances of such initiatives will be even greater.
- Low financial incentives it means also becoming less attractive to developers. - for which developers? I understand that it's about delegates because they are paid. Let's ask how much @prolina earned because probably no one doubts his contribution to the ecosystem. Thanks to my suggestions, in the end, such developers will be able to bloom in a lisk.

I will also paste a few of my entries that I have made available to the lisk.chat so that they do not get lost and also present several scenarios of how this proposal works.

"arguments that if profits from forging will be lower then delegates will not develop the ecosystem is wrong. It does not really matter, because they do not do it because they want to develop the ecosystem. Proof of gratitude, do you know? The same is true when we are standing at the crossroads of the road and the boy approaches our car and immediately cleans windows (sometimes even when we do not want it) What happens later? He comes to us and wants money. We give them because it is stupid to give nothing because he did some work for us. Delegates also have the same function, some (Some delegates, because there is a large group that does nothing), it is simply stupid to take money and not do anything totally.
In addition, I am almost convinced (it's just guesses) because we do not have any reports. That money can be burned and all management is not economically optimal.
In addition, today the delegates form the lisk center, but they may close it in 5 months as well and no one should blame it. I remind the delegates they do it willingly that today they show good-naturedness does not mean that they will do it later.
The solution is simple: DAO, where the community decides who will receive subsidies, where to open a new center, etc.

cc001 -  I disagree. Would you as delegate give up your day job and work fulltime for lisk, and donate to others, if you get only a halve-day-salary per month?? Honestly, I don't think so.
Santerr - "but in my proposal, the delegate does not have to do anything but maintain the forging. DAO takes over the role of the delegate in terms of ecosystem development. This, in my opinion, is much more optimal and we will be able to do a lot more things.
and so most delegates do nothing but forging. Praise to those who have acted so far for the development of the ecosystem but we are reaching the point where we can relieve delegates from this hard work.

to encourage delegates to good forging and keeping nodes at a high level. I would introduce in the protocol the growth of spoil in a specific timeframe by a certain percentage (numbers to be determined). Additional proceeds would be covered by DAO. In case the delegate makes 90% available, even a few% would be a significant increase in earnings.

You have to calculate it more or does it make sense, but I think it would be a good incentive.

For example, by maintaining a reliable node for a year you get an additional 10% from DAO. If your node is not working properly for some time, you are lowering the level."

"In such a case, a situation may arise that the delegate declares in DAO his proposal to create a project which we put to vote and decide whether to trust this delegate and provide him with funds for implementation or not. If we decide to help the delegate, we REQUIRE from him the implementation of what he has decided. Now we have nothing, we are moving on empty words and promises that do nothing to the ecosystem."

"First of all, everything is clear and clear, because one of the problems is also that the delegates take a lot, but they do nothing. DAO solves this. Like the problem of sharing 90% of profits.

Being a delegate will also be a more elite place for people who really care about development. For (for example) 10% profit from noda (numbers to attention) can still be high earnings. In addition, the delegate can continuously develop their projects by submitting applications at DAO. A delegate who will have more confidence will earn even more.

Ask yourself if delegates who want 90% of profits, or they will not do anything, want ecosystems well or not, maybe something else?
If the delegate tells me that he will not be motivated to act for the community, because he will not earn enough. I answer him: Hey, okay, no problem. This money does not disappear all the time, they are waiting for you, all you have to do is present us your project and convince us that it is worth investing in it and you will receive the money for implementation. You can be anonymous, we do not want to know who you are, all we need is results and implementation.

I do not think the delegates have a better verifier. 😉
it also does not close the existence of cartels. But only if the cartels work for the development of the ecosystem because only then will they receive additional funds."


Unchecked money is spent carelessly and inefficiently, no one doubts that delegates primarily care about their own but not the development of the ecosystem, so we can assume that part of the money is simply blown. Of course, I do not have a grudge and I do not want to look into anyone's wallet - it only shows the inefficiency of this system. The DAO Fund solves this problem and takes away the power of the cartels. It causes that power really gets into the hands of the community and that it decides about further development. A greater number of programmers have the opportunity to develop their projects. I am curious what HQ thinks and think about the community because it seems quite a good and not too difficult solution in the implementation.

Glory of Minions

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